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Determinants of financial covenants and 
pricing of debt in private debt contracts: 
the UK evidence 
Lance Moir and Sudi Sudarsanam* 
Abstract-This paper presents details of financial covenants given by a sample drawn from the largest 200 non- 
financial quoted firms in the UK in private debt contracts and analyses these data to see whether there are rela- 
tionships between the nature of the covenants given and firm characteristics. Data were obtained from 72 firms. of 
which 17 gave no financial covenants. Firm size was found to be the only significant factor influencing whether 
firms did or did not give covenants as well as the only factor which influenced the margin given on debt. Some 
types of covenants given were found to be different from those found in previous research. In particular, there is 
greater use of EBITDA as a base for both interest cover and gearing covenants. This shows the importance of cash 
flow based lending as opposed to asset based lending for general financing for large firms. 
Key words: Debt contracts. debt pricing, financial covenants, costly contracting. 
1. Introduction 
Long-term committed loan agreements typically 
contain financial covenants. A financial covenant 
is an undertaking given by a borrower to its lender 
to maintain a minimum or maximum level of a fi- 
nancial measure such as gearing or net worth or in- 
terest cover. Borrowers may undertake to provide 
covenants from a variety of motives, e.g. to in- 
crease the availability of lending, to reduce the risk 
to the lender and thereby reduce the cost of bor- 
rowing. Lenders similarly may require covenants 
to reduce the risk of default, to facilitate monitor- 
ing and to lend at lower interest rates. The agreed 
covenants may reflect the borrower characteristics 
that, from the lender’s point of view, have a bear- 
ing on the latter’s risk exposure. 
The giving as well as the receiving of financial 
covenants entails both costs and benefits to the 
borrowers and the lenders. The costs to the bor- 
rowers include the direct costs of writing the fi- 
nancial covenant contracts and the compliance 
costs such as maintaining the accounting informa- 
tion system. They also include indirect costs that 
result from the suboptimal investment and financ- 
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ing decisions the borrower is constrained to make 
by the financial covenants. For example, under the 
constraints of financial covenants a firm may fol- 
low an overly conservative investment policy 
thereby foregoing potentially value-enhancing in- 
vestment opportunities. The benefits to the bor- 
rowers may include increased access to finance 
and lower borrowing costs. 
The costs to the lender include the costs of writ- 
ing financial covenant contracts, monitoring the 
borrower’s compliance and enforcing the financial 
covenants in the event of default. The benefits con- 
sist of a lending opportunity, reduced risk expo- 
sure, better debt management through ongoing 
monitoring or providing an early warning signal 
that reduces the cost of default. 
Financial covenants are written in the case of 
both public debt, e.g. bonds, and private bank debt. 
In the case of the former, the presence of a wide di- 
versity of lenders and investors may lead to a cer- 
tain degree of covenant standardisation 
(Iskandar-Datta and Emery, 1994). On the other 
hand, in  private debt the range and type of 
covenants are negotiated directly between the 
lender and the borrower. Such private agreements 
may see a wide range of borrower company-spe- 
cific covenants due to lower costs of renegotiation 
than in the case of public debt. They also provide 
the opportunity to tailor or customise covenants to 
suit the individual borrower’s financial and other 
characteristics better (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). 
In contrast to several studies that have examined 
financial covenants in public debt, there are very 
few studies that have investigated the determinants 
of financial covenants in, and their impact on the 
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pricing of, private debt. Given the greater diversi- 
ty of covenants in private debt agreements for the 
above reasons, a study of financial covenants in 
private debt may provide more insights into their 
determinants than one based on public debt. 
Much of the research into financial covenants 
has been based on US data on public debt (Smith 
and Warner. 1979) or on private debt contracts that 
are required to be filed. but based upon public 
precedents (Leftwich. 1983; Dichev and Skinner, 
2002). Unlike in the US where researchers have 
relied on public filings of private loan agreements 
(Leftwich, 1983; Press and Weintrop, 1990), ac- 
cess to such data is difficult in the U K  since com- 
panies are not obliged to disclose this information 
publicly. UK companies regard details of 
covenants as highly sensitive matters that should 
be kept confidential. Within the UK, Citron 
(1992a) has studied bank lending covenants. He 
has also examined financial covenants in public 
debt contracts (Citron, 1992b) and finds that many 
public debt contracts do not include financial 
covenants (Citron, 1995; Malitz. 1986). However, 
our knowledge of private debt covenants, their de- 
terminants and their impact on debt pricing is very 
limited. While Day and Taylor (1  996b) report an 
interview-based study of corporate treasurers con- 
cerning the motivations and the consequences of 
financial covenants in private debt contracts, 
analysis of the determinants of private debt finan- 
cial covenants and the pricing of that debt, based 
on objective and publicly available data, is still 
lacking. 
In this study, we provide evidence of financial 
covenants associated with private debt for a sam- 
ple of the largest UK corporate borrowers generat- 
ed from a survey of the largest 200 non-financial 
UK firms in 1999. We examine whether the inci- 
dence, type and frequency of financial covenants 
in these private debt contracts are determined by 
borrower characteristics. We also examine whether 
borrower characteristics influence the cost of pri- 
vate debt that the sample borrower is contracted t o  
Pay. 
For a sample of 55 covenanters and 17 non- 
covenanters, we find that covenanters are more 
healthy companies with a lower bankruptcy risk 
but they exhibit a higher level of systematic stock 
return risk. Neither difference is, however, signifi- 
cant. Larger firms are significantly less likely to 
offer financial covenants. There is little difference 
between covenanters and non-covenanters in 
terms of their profitability and cash flow in the 
year prior to the signing of the financial covenants. 
Covenanters, however. pay out a significantly 
smaller proportion of their earnings as dividends, 
perhaps reflecting the greater liquidity constraints 
on these firms. In a multivariate logistic model, 
however, firm size is the only determinant of the 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
decision to offer covenants with larger firms being 
able to avoid doing so. Borrower size also has a 
significant impact by lowering the price of debt. 
No other variable is able to explain the pricing. 
This reliance on a single characteristic to the 
neglect of other indicators that have traditionally 
and empirically been associated with default risk, 
debt service capacity and risk premium raises in- 
triguing issues about the models used by lenders to 
assess default risk and price their lending. We 
speculate on the reasons for lenders not to fine- 
tune the covenant requirements and margin on 
lending to borrower characteristics. 
Our paper also sheds light on the way types of fi- 
nancial covenants given in private debt have 
changed in response to changes in accounting dis- 
closure rules in the UK and the increasing interest 
in cash flow-based covenants. Our study 
fills a significant gap in our knowledge of finan- 
cial covenants in private debt; 
e in p i r i c all y ex am i n e s the characteristics of 
covenanters and non-covenanters in private debt 
contracts in the UK; 
provides insights into the borrower characteris- 
tics that determine the incidence, type and range 
of financial covenants given private debt con- 
tracts; and 
provides evidence on whether borrower charac- 
teristics influence the pricing of private debt 
contracts. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 
we review the lite;*atitre and deduce some testable 
implications of the costly contracting and agency 
models for financial covenants, especially in pri- 
vate debt contracts. Section 3 describes how sur- 
vey data for our analysis were generated. We also 
set out the methodology employed in the study. In 
Section 4 we present and discuss the empirical re- 
sults and their implications for both theory and 
practice concerning debt contracts and financial 
covenants. The final section provides a summary 
and conclusions. 
2. Review of the literature 
2.1. Tlie p i i p ) s t  of:fi'ntriicirrl cowiitrtits - costly 
coiittvrctiiig hypothesis 
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that the principal 
purpose of loan covenants is to manage the con- 
tlict between lenders and borrowers arising from 
the i n for in a t io n as y m me t ry bet w ee t i  them. 
Financial covenants enable lenders to control the 
risk that they accept for a pre-determined return. 
They may serve to limit a borrower's flexibility in 
future decision-making (Smith and Warner, 1979; 
Berlin and Mester, 1992 cited i n  Mather, 1999b). 
To the extent that they restrict the borrower from 
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their benefits to costs. 
Under the agency model, the type and range of 
financial covenants demanded by the lender and 
proffered by the borrower depend on the scope for 
agency conflict between the two. This in turn de- 
pends on the borrower characteristics such as its 
free cash flow, its prior debt service record or 
whether the debt is secured. Lenders use financial 
covenants as instruments to manage and reduce the 
agency conflict. To the extent financial covenants 
mitigate agency costs to the lenders, the costs to 
the borrowers may fall. 
making profitable investments, they may have a 
detrimental effect on firm value (Myers, 1977). 
Thus, entering into financial covenants may im- 
pose significant opportunity costs on borrowers. 
Under the costly contracting hypothesis both the 
borrower and the lender enter into an optimal set 
of financial covenants that maximise their return- 
to-risk tradeoff. Since financial covenant contract- 
ing is costly, the benefits from entering into such 
contracts should, in equilibrium, at least equal the 
costs. Smith and Warner (1 979) argue that since 
covenants are a persistent phenomenon, these pro- 
visions should be deemed efficient from the stand- 
point of the firm’s owners. The costly contracting 
model implies that the type and range of financial 
covenants that a borrower has to provide to the 
lender are a matter of negotiation between the two. 
The negotiation will be subject to a number of 
parameters that define the riskiness of the loan, 
need for a costly contract, and cost of formulating 
and enforcing the contract. These in turn are likely 
to depend on the borrower characteristics that will 
influence the lender’s perception of the credit risk. 
Moreover, the lenders may calibrate the terms of 
lending including the type and range of financial 
covenants to suit the borrower’s perceived risk.’ If 
under the costly contracting hypothesis, financial 
covenants are a risk management tool for the 
lenders and an efficient mechanism for the bor- 
rower to minimise its borrowing costs, we can 
expect to find an association between the determi- 
nants of financial covenants and the pricing of 
debt. 
2.2. The pirrpose cffinaiicial covennnts - the 
agency perspective 
A different, but related, perspective on financial 
covenants derives from the agency model of the 
firm. Managers are the lender’s agents in the dis- 
position of the borrowed funds (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Thus lending entails agency 
monitoring. If the agency costs are too high, the 
managers run the risk of either not being able to 
borrow at all or borrowing at a high cost. To avoid 
or mitigate that risk, managers undertake to pro- 
vide financial covenants that may reduce the 
agency monitoring cost to the lender. The costs 
borne by the borrower are thus in the nature of 
bonding costs. Again, borrower managers will op- 
timise the use of financial covenants by trading off 
’ Myers ( I  977) observes that the optimal situation would re- 
quire no covenants and ’voluntary forbearance would be the 
simplest and best solution. ..[blut a reputation for honesty is 
acquired mainly by performance’. Mather ( 1999b) finds that 
the tightness of covenants is indeed linked to management 
reputation for debt servicing. Therefore. sonic well-estab- 
lished firms would not need tn hear the costs of (tight) 
covenants and that banks would lend without covcn;int\ for 
the same return. 
2.3. Review of prior enipirical evidence 011 
fi’ncincial covenants 
The borrower ’s perspective 
In order for financial covenants to serve a bor- 
rower’s economic purpose, the conceding of finan- 
cial covenants should be reflected in lower loan 
pricing. The tighter the covenants the lower still 
should be the loan pricing. In particular Smith and 
Warner (1 979) suggest there should be an optimal 
set of covenants in terms of number, type of 
covenant and tightness of such covenants that 
would maximise firm value. Several studies pro- 
vide empirical evidence on tightness of covenants 
and loan pricing from both borrower’s and 
lender’s perspectives (see below). 
Malitz ( 1986) similarly examines the role of 
bond covenants in agency conflicts and argues that 
‘for large firms, where information is readily 
available and reputation is both established and re- 
viewed often, the cost of explicit covenants ex- 
ceeds any possible benefits.’ Citron (1992b) finds 
evidence that larger public companies are able to 
avoid covenants and attributes this to ‘large com- 
panies having less need to use covenants to pre- 
vent lenders price-protecting themselves’. 
The lender’s perspective 
Covenants represent a means of controlling ex- 
pected losses to the lender from the borrower’s de- 
fault. Bradley (2001), in commenting on the 
proposed changes to bank capital adequacy rules 
under Basel 11, suggests ‘there will be much more 
focus on credit quality overall and borrowers 
should be prepared for lenders to push harder for 
covenants that protect credit quality.’ 
Day and Taylor ( I996a) observe a wider range of 
purposes that lenders seek to serve through 
covenants. Covenants in  loans provide lenders 
with one or more of the following: an early warn- 
ing signal or a renegotiation lever; control or com- 
fort; the ability to restrict management discretion 
i n  financing and investment decisions; and a 
means to call the loan. 
Day and Taylor observe a clear bias towards the 
first purpose. In particular the bankers cited in 
their study were clear that covenants ‘crystallise 
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terms of the agreement at the outset’ and also that 
‘covenants.. .ensure that the lender’s position is no 
worse than the worst-case scenario.’ The purpose 
of covenants is not only to manage the agency con- 
flict, but also to limit the level of risk that the lend- 
ing banker is willing to accept. Thus, although the 
costs of monitoring the covenants may be high, the 
presumed economic benefit is lower loss to lenders 
and hence lower cost to the borrower (see Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002 for similar arguments). 
There is also evidence that lenders seek 
covenants as part of an overall credit - pricing 
equation. Iskandar-Datta and Emery (1994), in 
their study of indenture provisions in public bond 
contracts, find that restrictiveness of covenants 
significantly affects the rating of a new debt issue 
and thus, via bond pricing, the interest rate. 
McDaniel (1986) reports an instance of a rating 
agency being involved in determining the inclu- 
sion of covenants which could point to some cus- 
tomisation of covenants. Metzgen (2000) notes 
while discussing current market terms that, 
‘whereas some investors had simply relied on a 
corporate’s unsecured credit rating or even its rep- 
utation, they are now demanding increased credit 
protection through covenants.’ This argument also 
points to the inter-relationship among reputation, 
tightness of covenants and pricing. 
Are covenants customised to serve borrower and 
lender purposes? 
While both the costly contracting hypothesis and 
the agency model indicate that financial covenants 
are likely to be customised to the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of each borrower, whether they are 
indeed customised in actual loan agreements needs 
to be empirically established. According to Day 
and Taylor (1997), many UK treasurers do not be- 
lieve that the financial covenants negotiated are ef- 
fective from the lenders’ point of view: ‘[Tloo 
often the covenants used by lenders were not suf- 
ficiently relevant to the fundamentals of the corpo- 
rate borrowers’ businesses.’ This may be a 
perception on the part of the borrowers or it may 
be that, in the lenders’ judgment, the incremental 
costs of customising covenants do not offer eco- 
nomic benefits that match or exceed those costs. 
Day and Taylor conclude that lenders’ behaviour is 
driven by market norms and individual bank prac- 
tice and so there will be a lag behind innovative 
practice in setting financial covenants. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
In practice, the actual covenants are part of a 
process of negotiation, presumably based on mar- 
ket power and the skill of the negotiators (Day and 
Taylor, 1995). In focusing on the largest compa- 
nies in our survey, we may presume that these 
companies employ the most skilled negotiators in 
this area. Thus we may assume that the observed 
pattern of covenants in our sample reflects the best 
set of covenants that could be achieved for the bor- 
rowers involved. 
Existence and variety of financial covenants in 
private loan contracts 
Previous research into financial covenants in pri- 
vate loan agreements has been limited. Researchers 
have little information access to the types of 
covenants in loan agreements that do not have to 
be disclosed publicly. Much of the literature on fi- 
nancial covenants has been based on public bond 
covenants in the United States (e.g. Smith and 
Warner, 1979). In the UK bond market, Citron 
(1995) finds that 30% of the 108 public bond 
agreements he examined contained accounting- 
based covenants, the majority of which relate to 
gearing. Among a few studies that have examined 
private loan agreements are Mohrman (1996) in 
the US, Citron (1992a) and Day and Taylor 
(1996a) in the UK and Mather (1999b) and 
Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) in Australia. 
Our study focuses on private debt agreements in 
bank loans. Bank lending, as opposed to bonds, is 
reported to account for 89% of European lending 
as opposed to US practice where bonds represent 
80% of corporate borrowing (Treasury Today, 
2000). Therefore, in contrast to the predominantly 
bond-focused studies in the US, it is appropriate in 
the UK context to focus on bank covenants rather 
than bonds. 
An important characteristic of the bond market 
is the provision of debt by many lenders without 
the ability easily to renegotiate loan terms. 
However, the private banking market affords an 
opportunity for ongoing dialogue with borrowers 
and the opportunity to revise terms in accordance 
with changing scenarios? It is therefore logical 
that there should be debt contracts with specifical- 
ly tailored covenants and renegotiation options 
(Mather, 1999b). Several studies establish that pri- 
vate loan covenants are more varied than those in 
bond agreements (Gopalkrishnan and Prakash, 
1995; Mather, 1999a; Mohrman, 1996). 
Do these varied loan covenants represent appro- 
priate restrictions on borrower’s investment and fi- 
nancing decisions or are they merely costless 
concessions, because they are so loose, that bor- 
rowers offer in order to enhance the comfort level 
to lending banks? In the latter case, the costly con- 
tracting hypothesis would not provide a complete 
rationale for the levels at which loan covenants are 
set or it might be that market participants (bankers 
Companies borrow either (i) from financial institutions in 
the money markets (‘loans’) either from banks individually or 
via groups of banks in club loans or by syndication or (ii) from 
a wide range of institutional investors in the capital markets 
(‘bonds’) (Cates, 1999). Short debt maturity also provides 
renegotiation options to alleviate the information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers and so public debt and bank 
lending provides different mechanisms for alleviating moral 
hazard from borrowers (Diamond, 1991a, 1991b) 
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and corporate financial managers) do not consider 
the setting of loan covenants in terms of strict eco- 
nomic trade-off as suggested by Day and Taylor 
(1996a). Equally, covenants might provide bene- 
fits of flexibility to borrowers in that they can re- 
tain the original terms if their credit deteriorates, 
provided the borrower does not breach the 
covenants. Therefore, our research has also gath- 
ered some views from companies on how effective 
they perceive the covenants to be in restricting 
their decisions. This is particularly appropriate 
when dealing with the largest companies about 
which information is widely available and also 
which are also more likely to have sophisticated fi- 
nancial managers able to negotiate effectively. 
As Day and Taylor ( 1998) observe, in practice a 
certain type of debt contract may be treated as the 
norm without detailed consideration of whether 
the particular set of covenants has an economic 
basis. For example, much of the US-based litera- 
ture talks of covenants that restrict dividend pay- 
ments (Smith and Warner, 1979), yet UK and 
Australian literature do not find this restriction. Do 
private lenders choose standardised or ‘boiler- 
plate’ covenants (Leftwich, 1983, Citron, 1992b) 
as occurs in the bond markets (Kahan and 
Klausner, 1997) or are they able to tailor covenants 
to each situation? Some of the previous studies 
have failed to address this question by concentrat- 
ing upon standard documents such as the 
American Bar Foundation Commentaries on 
Indentures (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
There have been three significant studies of pri- 
vate loan agreements in the UK. Citron (1992b), in 
his survey of 33 lending bankers, studies ‘typical’ 
(standardised lawyer’s) loan agreements, focusing 
on the covenants that bankers would like to use 
rather than the covenants actually used by individ- 
ual borrowers. Citron (1992a) in a separate study 
examines 25 actual loan contracts and 13 contract 
templates but focuses on accounting definitions 
rather than the relationship between covenants and 
individual borrower characteristics. Furthermore, 
we learn very little about the borrowers in these 
actual loan agreements.’ 
The widest ranging study of financial covenants 
in private loan agreements to date is by Day and 
Taylor ( 1996b) who interviewed 44 UK corporate 
treasurers. They report that the three most com- 
mon covenants relate to balance-sheet gearing, in- 
terest cover and minimum tangible net worth. 
Balance-sheet gearing was the most common (39 
responses). The occurrence of these forms of 
covenant confirms Citron’s (19924 earlier re- 
search into bank documents. Mather ( 1  9994,  from 
155 
interviews with bankers in Australia, establishes 
that the minimum interest cover and maximum 
debt or gearing ratio are the most frequently used 
covenants. Day and Taylor (1996b) also provide 
limited evidence of large companies being able to 
avoid financial covenants in private loan agree- 
ments completely. In their survey of 44 companies 
only two companies (both in the largest 20 by mar- 
ket capitalisation) did not give covenants. 
None of these papers looks in detail at the tight- 
ness of the covenants or the nature of the 
covenants by type of borrower. Indeed, Day and 
Taylor (1997) state that ‘relatively little is known 
about the variation in ... the value of financial 
covenants with factors such as the borrower’s in- 
dustry, size...’. Citron (1992b) also suggests that 
his research could be ‘extended by examining 
whether the ratios used.. .vary with the industry 
sector of the borrower.’ 
There is conflicting evidence on the existence of 
covenants relating to cash flow, despite their at- 
traction to lenders whose concern is the availabili- 
ty of cash to repay loans. Day and Taylor (1 996b) 
note their virtual absence, whereas Mather (1 999a) 
identifies some awareness of cash flow covenants 
in his research of bankers in Australia. Dichev and 
Skinner (2002) also identify a range of cash flow 
covenants, including debt to cash flow as the most 
common in the specialist area of management buy- 
outs and buy-ins. However, Citron et al. ( 1  997) 
find that covenants involving cash flows and divi- 
dend restrictions are almost universal. 
This review of empirical studies suggests that, in 
private loan agreements, lenders still tend to use 
common covenants that are not significantly cus- 
tomised to the borrower profile in terms of indus- 
try, size, or cash flow. In this paper we provide 
evidence on whether this conclusion is still rele- 
vant to more recent private loan agreements in the 
UK than those analysed by Citron and Day and 
Taylor. 
Presumably because the loan agreeinent documents were 
obtained from lenders rather than borrowers and that the 
lenders would have been obliged to maintain confidentiality. 
2.4. Hypotheses tested 
From our theoretical and empirical literature re- 
view, we derive the following null hypotheses: 
H1: Firm specific characteristics of the borrowers 
are irrelevant to the decision of borrowers to 
offer financial covenants; 
H2: The type of financial covenants given has no 
influence upon the pricing of private debt; 
and 
H3: Pricing of private debt is independent of bor- 
rower characteristics. 
Under the agency model, the alternative hypoth- 
esis to H 1 is that firms with characteristics that re- 
duce the agency conflict between managers and 
lenders will not offer financial covenants. Under 
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the costly contracting model, the alternative hy- 
pothesis to H2 is that more frequent use of 
covenants or more stringent covenants will lead to 
lower cost of debt. The alternative to H3 is that 
firm characteristics that reduce the chances of de- 
fault and loan loss to the lender will reduce the 
cost of debt. In the next section we describe the 
data and methodology to test these hypotheses. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Survey of companies and data on financial 
covenants 
To identify the covenants in current use in loan 
agreements we carried out a survey of large corpo- 
rate borrowers in the UK during 1999. The focus 
of this survey is on borrowers rather than lenders. 
Accordingly, we sent out letters, seeking details of 
the financial covenants in loan agreements, to the 
finance director or senior member of the Treasury 
department of the largest 200 non-financial UK 
companies, defined by market capitalisation at the 
end of April 1999. An initial mailing was sent to 
members of the Association of Corporate 
Treasurers, which accounted for 70% of the 200 
companies - data were obtained from some 50% 
of this group. In all other instances, a letter with 
identical terms to the one sent to the first group 
was sent to the finance director of the company 
concerned - however, the response rate here was 
only a little over 30%, and within this response 
rate nearly half refused to provide the required in- 
formation. The higher response rate from the first 
group may be attributed.to three factors: 
The direct interest of corporate treasurers in the 
results of the research; 
Many respondents knew, or knew of, one of the 
researchers and were more prepared to respond; 
and 
The familiar reluctance of finance directors to 
respond to ‘cold’ research requests. 
It may be that responding corporate treasurers 
are more likely to be involved in negotiating loan 
covenants and so the responses will be well in- 
formed. However, there is no ground for any pre- 
sumption of bias in our sample arising from the 
responses from treasurers as opposed to the other 
respondents, given that we are looking for in- 
formed respondents. In the few cases in which the 
response has come from the finance director, six 
were from firms with no debt and in the responses 
from borrowers almost always came from another 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:03
 29
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
Vol. 37 No. 2. 2007 157 
Table 2 
Borrower characteristics as explanatory variable - definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Size 
Sales Annual turnover 
Profitability 
EBIT/TA 
EB ITD A/TA 
Risk 
Beta 
Z score 
Liquidity 
Dividend payout (DPR) 
Free cash flow (FCF) 
Gearing 
Total liabilitiedtotal assets Total liabilities including current liabilities/total assets 
Earnings before tax and interest divided by total assets 
Earnings before tax, interest, depreciation, and amortisation divided by total assets 
The sensitivity of the borrower share price to market wide share price movements 
Weighted average of financial ratios that measures potential bankruptcy risk 
Equity dividend divided by net income 
EBITDA minus capital expenditure and working capital movements divided by 
total assets 
member of the finance department. 
Financial companies were excluded due to their 
different capital structures compared with industri- 
al companies and, therefore, potentially different 
ranges and types of covenants! Copies of the ac- 
tual pages of the loan agreements were requested, 
including definitions, interest margin on the loans 
and the terms of the agreement. Many respondents 
did not provide the pages of the loan agreement, 
but did summarise the information requested in the 
form of a letter or by providing copies of the inter- 
nal documents used to monitor compliance with 
loan agreements. Given the broad understanding 
of the terms involved and the sophistication of the 
respondents, information provided in letters has 
been considered on the same basis as actual agree- 
ments. In two instances, information was obtained 
verbally from the head of the responding Treasury 
department and noted by one of the authors. 
Replies were received from 106 companies 
(53%), of which 24 indicated that they did not 
wish to participate, some because they had entered 
into confidentiality undertakings, others because 
they did not respond to surveys on policy or re- 
source grounds. This left 82 usable responses 
(41%). Of these, 10 companies stated that they had 
no debt, leaving an effective sample of 72 borrow- 
ing companies. 
Table 1 indicates the number of financial 
covenants given by the respondents who borrowed 
and the type of covenants given. A large minority 
~ 
.I Financial companies may be subject to prudential regula- 
tion. This may reduce the default risk to lenders and they may 
rely less on financial covenants or on a narrower range of fi- 
nancial covenants. Financial covenants may also be less tight 
than in the case of non-financial borrowers. 
of borrowing firms, 17 (24%), gave no covenants. 
More than half, 38 (53%) gave one or two 
covenants. The number of firms giving four or 
more covenants is very small, only 5 (7% of the 
sample). The sample indicates that large UK bor- 
rowers make parsimonious use of covenants. 
3.2. Borrower characteristics 
The explanatory variables are firm specific char- 
acteristics reflecting the need for, and scope, of 
lender monitoring of the borrowers through the in- 
strument of covenants: 
borrower size as a measure of both the borrower 
resources to service debt and its bargaining 
power to negotiate, whether to sign financial 
covenants and what types of financial covenants 
to sign; 
prior profitability of the borrower, a measure of 
the borrower’s ability to service debt; 
its liquidity, a measure of solvency of the bor- 
rower; 
its prior debt commitments, a measure of the risk 
to lender; 
its risk profile, a measure of risk to lender; 
the industry to which the borrower belongs. 
Table 2 provides definitions of the accounting 
and stock market based proxies for firm character- 
istics. Financial data on each borrower’s character- 
istics such as turnover, total debt and market 
capitalisation were also collected from the com- 
puterised databases, Company Analysis, FAME 
and Thomson Research and London Business 
School’s Risk Measurement Service (RMS). 
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Beta is the systematic risk of the firm’s equity 
shares and is taken from the London Business 
School Risk Measurement Service (RMS) as at 1 
April 1999. The balance sheet and income state- 
ment variables are calculated from the last ac- 
counting period ending with the most recent 
annual report prior to the survey in April 1999. We 
regard dividend payout as a liquidity measure 
since a low payout allows the borrowing firms to 
retain more of their operating cash flows to finance 
their operations and investments. 
The Z score is a measure of potential bankrupt- 
cy risk. Altman (1968) popularised the Z score as 
a measure of a firm’s bankruptcy likelihood. In the 
UK, a popular Z score model used by banks and 
industrial firms is developed by Taffler (1983, 
1984). Firms with a negative Z score are classified 
as potential failures, as their financial profiles re- 
semble those of previously bankrupt firms. The 
model, developed using linear discriminant analy- 
sis techniques, takes the following form: 
z = Cg + c , x, + c, x, + c3x,  + c4x4 
where X I  ... X, denote the financial ratios, and c I  ... 
c4 the coefficients that are proprietary. There are 
two versions. The first is used to analyse listed 
manufacturing and construction companies and 
has component ratios (with the Mosteller-Wallace 
percentage contribution measure in brackets): 
profit before tax/current liabilities (53%), current 
assetdtotal liabilities (1 3%), current liabilities/ 
total assets (18%) and no-credit interval (16%): 
The second variant is used to rate listed retail en- 
terprises and has ratios: cash flow/total liabilities 
(34%), debt/quick assets (lo%), current liabili- 
tiedtotal assets (44%) and no-credit interval 
(12%). In this paper, we employ the Z scores de- 
veloped by Taffler to define distress? The sample 
size is reduced from 72 to 66 by the non-availabil- 
ity of data on some of these variables such as 
BETA and Z score. 
We also analyse the industry affiliation of a bor- 
rower as a relevant explanatory variable since in- 
dustry related risk may influence private debt 
providers to demand financial covenants or the 
type of financial covenants they prefer. Moreover, 
industry practice may also have a similar impact 
(Citron, 1992b and Day and Taylor, 1997). 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
3.3. Methodology 
The survey responses received were analysed by 
type of covenant in use (e.g. debt/ net worth), the 
level of the covenant was noted and the combina- 
tions were analysed. We examine the sample dis- 
tribution of the covenants in terms of types of 
covenants and the levels of covenants for which 
we have numerical data. We carry out, first, a uni- 
variate analysis of the differences in borrower 
characteristics between covenanters i.e. borrower 
firms that give covenants and non-covenanters i.e. 
borrowers that do not give covenants. 
Second, we perform a multivariate logistic re- 
gression with the giving or not giving of financial 
covenants as the dichotomous dependent variable 
and the borrower characteristics as the discrimi- 
nating variables. This model allows us to estimate 
the probability of a borrower giving any covenant 
conditional upon its characteristic. This model al- 
lows us to test hypothesis H1 above. 
Third, we test for differences in the pricing of 
debt among borrowers offering different types of 
covenants. Price is the interest rate payable to the 
lender and is measured by the margin over the 
London Inter Bank Offered Rate or LIBOR. This 
allows testing of hypothesis H2 above. Finally, we 
run a multiple regression to test our hypothesis H3 
with this margin for the subsample of companies 
in the survey for which we have the margin data on 
financial covenants as dependent variable. The ex- 
planatory variables are bidder characteristics as 
well as the type of financial covenants given. 
No credit interval is the ratio of excess of quick assets over 
current liabilities to the projected daily operating expenditure 
(see Taffler, 1983 for elaboration of this definition). ‘ Taffler (1995) tracks the performance of this model from 
its development. Overall, it has had better than 98% success 
rate in classifying subsequently bankrupt companies as poten- 
tially insolvent (z<O) based on their last accounts prior to fail- 
ure, and exhibits true ex nnte predictive ability in statistical 
terms. We thank Professor Taffler and Dr Vineet Agarawal for 
supplying us with the z scores for our sample. 
4. Results 
4.1. Types offinancial covenants 
To explore whether covenants have changed 
since prior research, in particular, the use of 
covenants relating to cash flow and to revised ac- 
counting treatment of goodwill we examine the 
types of covenants in use by dividing the observed 
covenants into Traditional and New covenants. 
Table 1 analyses the particular financial covenants 
given and demonstrates the continuing prevalence 
of covenants relating to gearing, interest cover and 
minimum tangible net worth. 
There are covenants relating to cash flow, but 
they do not refer to the cash flow statement under 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 1 of the UK 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB, 1996). Three 
new covenants are identified: 
(i) a covenant limiting the debt to a multiple of 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation (‘EBITDA’) is applied in 13 compa- 
nies. The limits set fall in a range of 2.5 to 4.5 times 
EBITDA. This covenant may be regarded as a 
proxy for cash flow to provide capacity for debt re- 
payment before fresh capital expenditure and is not 
based on asset cover measures derived from bal- 
ance sheet values. One example of the definition of 
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earnings specifically excludes extraordinary and 
exceptional items (‘as defined in FRS 3’) and adds 
back amortisation of goodwill or other intangible 
assets ‘whether pursuant to Urgent Issues Task 
Force’ (UITF) Report 3 or FRS 10 or otherwise’. 
Thus the attempt is to arrive at normalised cash 
flow before working capital movements, payment 
of taxation or net capital expenditure. 
While this does not take account of free cash 
flow from an economic point of view (Leftwich, 
1983) it does represent a considerable change in 
practice. This financial covenant would appear to 
be current as one treasurer who was negotiating 
new debt during 1999 cited this covenant as one 
that many lenders were seeking. He resisted this 
covenant due to definition problems, especially 
those relating to calculating relevant earnings for 
businesses acquired mid-year which were funded 
by debt.8 All of the instances of this covenant with- 
in the sample were included in debt contracts 
signed between 1997 and 1999. Another treasurer 
using this form of debt limit said: ‘We have 
stopped using gearing as a covenant, viewing it as 
an unhelpful, meaningless measure.’ 
Interestingly, DebtIEBITDA, forming the basis 
of this new covenant, was identified by Beaver 
(1966) as the single best predictor of corporate 
bankruptcy. Thus, the covenant seems to be sup- 
ported by empirical evidence of its efficacy.’ 
(ii) A variant on interest cover, but measuring the 
ratio of interest cost to earnings before interest and 
depreciation and amortisation is conceded by 
seven companies - again, this is a measure ex- 
cluding non-cash items charged in the profit and 
loss account. Five of the seven instances of this 
covenant are set at a minimum multiple of three 
times EBITDA to interest cost.’” This shows an ap- 
proach based more on cash flow than on account- 
ing profit. 
(iii) There was a single instance of a covenant 
limiting the level of debt to a proportion of market 
capitalisation. This covenant is set at 50% of, in ef- 
fect, 75% of the market capitalisation of the com- 
pany.” The treasurer of this borrower explained 
that the assets of this business were largely intan- 
gible with considerable goodwill write-off. 
Therefore a traditional gearing covenant was inap- 
propriate. The treasurer also expected to replace 
this covenant with a traditional covenant now that 
‘accounting changes make goodwill written-off 
more visible and easier to add back’. This borrow- 
er also conceded a traditional interest cover 
covenant. 
(iv) One company alone had given a covenant 
relating explicitly to a minimum cash position. A 
former finance director of this company explained 
that this company had approached financial dis- 
tress and therefore this instance, together with the 
specific characteristics of the company’s business, 
159 
was designed for the specific situation. Cash, in 
this instance, was defined by reference to the actu- 
al cash balance at any given time. This company 
also provided the largest number of covenants, six, 
which the former finance director again explained 
as a desire to obtain financing by providing ‘what- 
ever reasonable covenants the banks wanted’. 
It seems that UK loan agreements are still pre- 
dominantly based on traditional, accrual-based ac- 
counting covenants although there is some 
recognition of cash flow measures. There is some 
indication that borrower’s specific financial posi- 
tion influences the type and number of covenants. 
4.2. The level at which covenants are set 
Given the frequency of the gearing covenant 
(defined as debt to shareholders funds) and the in- 
terest covenant, we are able to examine the levels 
at which they are set. Chart 1 sets out the levels at 
which interest cover covenants are set, typically in 
the range of two to three times: 
Chart 2 sets out the levels at which gearing 
covenants are set, frequently in excess of 100% 
Certainly, for UK quoted borrowers, the gearing 
covenant replicates a limitation on the level of bor- 
rowings typically included in the Articles of 
Association (one company in the sample actually 
took the precise definitions used in its Articles, but 
agreed the bank covenant at a lower level). 
4.3 Non-covenanters 
To explore the question of whether large compa- 
nies are able to avoid giving financial covenants 
altogether, we examine the number and nature of 
companies that do not give financial covenants. Of 
the companies with debt, 17 gave no covenants. 
The size rank distribution of the covenanters and 
non-covenanters, among the 200 largest UK com- 
panies that we sample from is as follows: 
Size rank Covenanters Non-covenanters 
(%I 
1-50 12 (22) 10 (59) 
51 - 100 20 (36) 5 (29) 
101 - 150 13 (24) 2 (21) 
150 - 200 10 (18) 0 ( 0 )  
Total 55 17 
’ The Urgent Issues Task Force of the UK Accounting 
Standards Board issues consensus accounting treatments to be 
adopted where unsatisfactory or conflicting interpretations of 
standards or the UK companies act have developed. 
Compliance with UITF abstracts is necessary in accounts that 
claim to give a true and fair view. 
‘This definition of Debt/EBITDA included all debt but only 
part of the post-acquisition earnings. ‘’ We thank one of the anonymous referees for drawing our 
attention to this empirical evidence. 
“’ The others were at 3.5 and 4.5 times 
I ’  The 75% was explained by the treasurer of this company 
as a way of allowing for share price volatility. 
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~~ 
Chart 1 
The frequency of levels of interest cover covenants (PBIT/ interest cost) 
Interest cover covenant 
Chart 2 
The frequency of levels of gearing covenant (debt/ shareholders funds) 
rc 
0 
Gearing covenant 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
Non - Cov cov Difference Nan-Cov cov Difference 
Mean Mean T-statistics Median Median Z-statistics 
Beta 
Z score 
DPR 
GEARING 
LNSALES 1 
EBITITA 
EBITDAITA 
FCFITA 
0.91 
1.23 
0.73 
0.29 
5.46 
0.13 
0.18 
0.10 
0.93 
1.35 
0.38 
0.32 
14.20 
0.13 
0.17 
0.09 
-0.39 0.90 
-0.10 0.76 
I .44 0.42 
-0.03 0.32 
3.74*** 15.36 
-0.07 0.10 
0.63 0.15 
0.33 0.06 
0.94 
1.07 
0.33 
0.30 
14.23 
0.11 
0.15 
0.09 
0.68 
0.17 
1.76” 
0.02 
3.56*** 
0.10 
0.29 
0.23 
For variable definitions see Table 2. SALES is natural log transformed to minimize impact of outliers. 
Accounting data are from the most recent accounting year ending prior to April 1999, the survey date. Beta is 
taken from the London Business School Risk Measurement Service as at the most recent date prior to April 
1999. T is statistic for test of difference in means and Z is statistic for test of difference in medians. ***, ** 
and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Non-Cov = Non-covenanters; Cov = 
Covenanters, The sample size varies between 72 and 66 for different variables because of data non-availability. 
Clearly, there is a size bias in this distribution 
with bigfirms tending to avoid covenants, a result 
confirmed in later analysis presented below. 
Whereas covenanters are distributed fairly evenly 
across the size bands, non-covenanters are clus- 
tered in the top bands. Companies giving no 
covenants were asked why they gave no 
covenants. Three companies that did not give fi- 
nancial covenants did not respond to this question. 
In other cases, multiple reasons were given. The 
dominant reason for not giving covenants was 
cited as ‘policy not to give covenants’, although 
four companies gave as the reason that they only 
used institutional (i.e. bond) markets, where 
covenants are less prevalent. 
4.4. Industry characteristics of covenanters and 
non-covenanters 
As noted in Section 2, industry affiliation of the 
borrower may influence the pattern of financial 
covenants. Both covenanters and non-covenanters 
in our sample are drawn from a wide range of in- 
dustries identified by the two-digit industry classi- 
fication of the London Stock Exchange. More than 
22 industries are represented in our sample. To ex- 
amine the industry influence on financial 
covenants we aggregate these industries into five 
larger categories that are likely to have broadly 
similar characteristics, such as liquidity, risk and 
profitability: We then test whether this larger in- 
dustry affiliation differentiates between covenan- 
ters and non-covenanters. The industry groups 
(and the number of respondents falling into each 
~~ ~ 
l 2  The non-significance of industry affiliation is also borne 
out when it is included in our multivariate logistic regression 
models. We therefore exclude them from the models reported 
in Section 4.5 below. 
by covenanter and non-covenanter) are as follows: 
manufacturing (12, 5); high technology (14,8); 
wholesale and retail (4,3); utility (1 3, 1); and serv- 
ice (12, 0). A chi-square statistical test of differ- 
ence in these distributions across industries shows 
that there is no significant difference between 
them. Nevertheless, the extent of covenanters and 
non-covenanters points to differences worthy of 
further examination. Notably, the typically high 
level of debt in utilities still attracts covenants. 
We need to be cautious in interpreting the results 
because of the small sample sizes of the two 
groups. The test statistic for the difference in the 
distribution of our two subgroups of firms is not 
significant. Thus, industry seems not to influence 
the decision of the borrowers to sign or not sign 
covenants. l 2  
4.5. Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
firm-specific characteristics of both covenanters 
and non-covenanters. The group mean and median 
are shown in the table. The table also provides the 
test statistics for the difference in means and me- 
dians of each of these variables between the two 
groups of borrowers. These univariate tests show 
that there is little difference between covenanters 
and non-covenanters in most of these firm charac- 
teristics. These two groups do not differ in terms of 
their systematic risk. Covenanter firms are also 
much more financially healthy than non-covenan- 
ters. The covenanters’ mean (median) Z score is 
1.35 (1.07) whereas non-covenanters have a much 
lower Z score, 1.23 (0.76). The differences are, 
however, not significant. 
The strongest differentiator between covenanters 
and non-covenanters is firm size. In Table 3 this 
is measured by total sales log-transformed to 
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Table 4 
Logistic regressions of the covenant decision 
Sample Size: 66 
BETA 
Z SCORE 
DPR 
GEARING 
LNSALES 
EBITITA 
EBITDAITA 
FCFITA 
Constant 
Correct Classification% 
Chi-square 
Nagelkerke R2 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff. sig . Coeff. Sig . Coeff. Sig . 
1.25 
-0.03 
4 . 1 7  
-1.1 1 
-1.26*** 
0.35 
18.99 
83.30% 
16.39** 
0.323 
0.24 
0.33 
0.28 
0.27 
0 .oo 
0.47 
0 .oo 
0.01 
1.12 
4 . 0 3  
4 . 2 3  
4 . 5 9  
-1.27*** 
-3.54 
19.90 
83.30% 
17.08* ** 
0.335 
0.27 
0.33 
0.22 
0.36 
0 .oo 
0.20 
0.00 
0.01 
1.23 
4 . 0 3  
4 . 1 8  
-1.05 
-1.26*** 
4 . 1 0  
19.03 
83.30% 
16.39** 
0.323 
0.24 
0.34 
0.27 
0.26 
0 .oo 
0.49 
0 .oo 
0.01 
The decision to give or not give covenants is codified as a dichotomous variable with covenantor = 1; non- 
covenantor = 0. Explanatory variables are as in Table 2. Sample size is reduced for want of data on Z score. 
***, ** and * represent significance at I % ,  5% and 10% levels respectively. Significance level is based on a 
one-tail test for explanatory variables while two-tail test for constant. 
minimise the effect of outliers. Firms agreeing to 
sign financial covenants are smaller firms. 
4.6. Multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
financial covenants 
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate 
logistic regression. The dependent variable is di- 
chotomised and coded as I for covenanters and 0 
for non-covenanters. Not all the variables from 
Table 3 are included in the analysis reported in 
Table 4 to avoid multicollinearity. Where the pair- 
wise correlation is high (>0.30) only one of the 
collinear variables is included at a time.I3 
Firm size is the only, and strongly significant, 
variable in the model and it maintains its signifi- 
cant impact even when industry variables are 
dropped. Large firms are significantly less likely 
to sign up to covenants than relatively small firms. 
This result confirms the conclusion based on the 
univariate analysis reported above. The ability of 
'' Given that size is the only significant variable in our lo- 
gistic model, we also reestimate the model with only size. 
Our conclusions and estimate of the impact of size on the 
probability of giving covenants are unchanged (see below) 
and therefore robust to the presence or absence of other vari- 
ables in the logistic model. '' In Models 1 to 3 in Table 4 some other variables ( e g .  
DPR, EBITDAiTA and BETA) have large coefficients that 
suggest that their economic impact may be large. However. 
the small sample size may have caused that impact to be sta- 
tistically insignificant. 
the larger firms to avoid giving financial covenants 
may be a reflection of their lower risk, greater liq- 
uidity or higher reputation. Larger firms may also 
be able to use their bargaining power to force pri- 
vate debt providers not to make lending conditions 
too onerous. This size impact prevails even when 
we control for other firm characteristics that may, 
a priori, influence the decision to demand or pro- 
vide financial covenants. In unreported analysis of 
the size ranking of the sample firms, we find that 
out of the 55 covenanters, 43 are between 51 and 
200 whereas only seven of the 17 non-covenanters 
fall into those ranks. 
The impact of accounting profitability and free 
cash flow measures is insignificant. Similarly, the 
firm's risk profile, whether measured by financial 
leverage or by stock market-based systematic risk, 
has little influence over the decision to provide 
covenants. Overall the conclusion is size matters 
and little else does.14 
How big is the impact of size? The logistic 
model provides an estimate of this. When the bor- 
rower's sales revenue, our proxy for size, doubles 
from the sample median SALES (LNSALES) of 
El  .95bn (14.48) to E3.90bn (15.18), the probabili- 
ty of the borrower giving financial covenants de- 
creases by 20.2%. If the size trebles to E5.85bn 
(15.58), the probability is further diminished by 
32.1%. On the other hand, if the firm size halves 
from the median level the probability increases by 
20%. These probability changes are consistent 
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Table 5 
Multiple regression of margin on explanatory variables 
Variable Coeff. t-statistic 
Model 1 
(Constant) 1.178 1.72 
BETA 0.156 0.74 
Z score 4 .001 4 . 1 8  
DPR 4 .003  4 . 0 5  
GEARING 4 .182  4 . 8 5  
LNSALES 4.067" -1.40 
EBIT/TA 0.476 0.78 
Sig . No. of Obs. Adj. R' 
37 4 . 0 4  
0.09 
0.23 
0.43 
0.48 
0.20 
0.09 
0.22 
Model 2 
(Constant) 
BETA 
Z score 
DPR 
GEARING 
LNSALES 
EBITDA/TA 
37 4 . 0 6  
1.246 1.73 0.09 
0.137 0.63 0.27 
-0 .oo 1 -0.16 0.44 
-0.002 4 . 0 4  0.49 
-0.151 -0.78 0.22 
4.070* -1.43 0.08 
0.256 0.44 0.33 
Model 3 
(Constant) 
BETA 
Z score 
DPR 
GEARING 
LNSALES 
FCF/TA 
37 4 . 0 6  
1.365 1.96 0.06 
0.148 0.66 0.26 
4.003 4 . 3 9  0.35 
4.002 4 . 0 3  0.49 
-0.121 -0.75 0.23 
4.077* -1 6 3  0.06 
0.1 10 0.58 0.28 
Model 4 
(Constant) 
LNSALES 
40 0.04 
1.203 2.35 0.02 
-0.059" - I  .62 0.06 
For definitions of explanatory variables see Table 2. Margin is in percentage. 't' is Student t test statistic. ***, 
** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. White's (1980) heteroscedasticity ad- 
justed t-statistics are reported. Sig. = Significance level is based on a one-tail test for explanatory variables 
while two-tail test for constant. In all models the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than two for any vari- 
able, well below the acceptable level of 10 for multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). 
across the three models in Table 4 and when 
LNSALES is the only explanatory variable. 
The foregoing results show that our hypothesis 
H1, i.e.firm specific characteristics of the borrow- 
ers are irrelevant to the decision of borrowers 
to offerfinancial covenants, is not supported. We 
find that borrower size is a significant determinant 
of this decision. 
4.7. Do financial covenants influence 
debt-pricing ? 
We have only limited data on the margins over 
LIBOR made available by the survey firms. 
Among the 55 covenanters in our sample, 40 firms 
reported margin data. The mean (median) margin 
is 37.5 basis points (35.0 basis points). Among the 
covenanters, 37 give traditional covenants, five 
give new covenants and 13 give covenants of both 
types. Among those for which we have margin 
data, we find that the differences among these 
three groups of covenanters in margins over 
LIBOR are not statistically significant. However, 
the small size of the new covenant group and the 
overlap between groups caused by firms giving 
both old and new types of covenants may have 
considerably weakened our tests. Nevertheless, 
in our sample, covenant type has no influence on 
the pricing of debt. Therefore, our hypothesis H2, 
i.e. the type of financial covenants given has no 
influence upon the pricing of private debt, is not 
refuted. 
In Table 5 we present the results of the multiple 
regression of the margin on borrowing on a num- 
ber of other variables that are expected to influ- 
ence the pricing of debt. These are the same 
variables as those we used in modelling the 
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covenant-giving decision since they are expected 
to influence both that decision and the related issue 
of pricing debt.I5 The sample size for this regres- 
sion is reduced to 37 for want of data on some of 
the explanatory variables e.g. BETA and Z score. 
Once again, the only variable that has a signifi- 
cant impact is borrower firm size. We then re-ran 
the regression with LNSALES as the only ex- 
planatory variable (see Model 4 in Table 5). This 
model shows that the variable is significant at the 
6% level. Larger firms are able to reduce the mar- 
gin they pay significantly.I6 With this model, we 
estimate that, when the borrower size, i.e. sales, 
doubles from the sample median of E1.95bn to 
&3.90bn, the margin on borrowing falls from about 
35.5 basis points to 31.2 points.17 Overall, our 
analysis, perhaps owing to the small sample size, 
sheds only limited light on how borrowers and 
lenders reach a pricing agreement. 
4.8.  Robustness tests 
In the analysis so far, data on our explanatory 
variables are for only one year from the financial 
statements immediately preceding the time of sur- 
vey i.e. April 1999. Since one year’s data may not 
reflect the stable characteristics of the borrowing 
firms, we also re-run our models in Tables 4 and 5 
with the accounting data averaged over the three 
accounting years preceding April 1999. The sam- 
ple size is reduced by data non-availability for 
some firms over all three years to 56 for the logis- 
tic model and to 32 for the margin model. As re- 
gards the logistic model, we still find that 
borrower size is the only significant variable (sig- 
nificant at 1%) and larger firms are less likely to 
give covenants. For the margin model, we find that 
l 5  As with the Table 4 models, we consider the pairwise cor- 
relations among explanatory variables in Table 5 OLS models 
and exclude highly collinear variables. In  our test for 
collinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics show 
that none of the remaining variables poses a collinearity prob- 
lem with a maximum VIF of only 1.57. On this test, see 
Gujarati (2003:362-363). 
I h  We apply a one-tail test since our expectation of the di- 
rection of impact of the explanatory variables is a priori clear. 
Moreover, a one-tail test has also more power to reject the null 
hypothesis of no impact when it is not true. 
As with the covenant models in Table 4, we find that 
some variables like BETA, GEARING and EBITDA/TA have 
large coefficients that suggest their economic impact may be 
large though the small sample size may have caused their sta- 
tistical insignificance. 
IX Beatty et a1 (2002) investigate the determinants of margin 
(called spread in their paper) in terms of loan specific charac- 
teristics rather than borrower specific characteristics except for 
borrower size. They report mean borrower size (natural log of 
sales in $) of 5.64 compared to about 15 (in S) in our study (see 
Table 3 above). Thus our sample consists of much larger firms. 
I’ Sample Pearson correlations show that LNSALES has a 
significant correlation only with DPR (0.18) and GEARING 
(-0.25). Pearson correlations are of a similar magnitude. 
These correlations are not large, albeit significant. With all the 
other variables the correlations are insignificant. 
the size coefficient is negative but insignificant, 
However, when we run the margin model with 
only LNSALES as an explanatory variable, the re- 
gression coefficient is 4 , 0 6 3  and significant at the 
6% level, similar to Model 4 in Table 5 .  The sam- 
ple size remains unchanged at 40. This increases 
our confidence that sampling variation or the 
length of time over which the explanatory vari- 
ables are estimated does not affect the basic result 
that borrower size has a significant, though weak, 
negative impact on loan margins but a much 
stronger negative impact on the covenant giving 
decision. 
From these various analyses, we conclude that 
borrower size is the most important and, on our ev- 
idence, the only variable that significantly influ- 
ences both whether the borrower gives covenants 
and at what price. None of the other firm charac- 
teristics has any influence on either aspect of the 
covenant problem. Our hypothesis, H3, i.e. pricing 
of private debt is independent of borrower charac- 
teristics, is not supported. Borrower size does have 
a significant impact on pricing. The margin-reduc- 
ing impact of borrower size is consistent with the 
finding of Beatty et al. (2002).’* 
4.9.  Overview of empirical results and future 
potential research 
Our empirical results suggest that the decision to 
give covenants is not determined by the idiosyn- 
cratic characteristics of the borrower apart from its 
size. There is little variation in these covenants 
across different borrower industries. Overall our 
results point to covenants not being sufficiently 
customised to match borrower characteristics. It 
appears that banks use covenants as a way of mon- 
itoring relatively small borrowers. UK banks seem 
to rely on size as a proxy for the financial strength 
and reputation of borrowers to reduce their agency 
problem with the latter. The large borrower size 
then substitutes for covenants as a monitoring tool 
for lenders. These results are consistent with the 
agency model of financial covenants. 
There is also little variation in debt pricing irre- 
spective of the type of covenant given. Only bor- 
rower size has a weak and negative influence on 
debt pricing. Thus we find only limited evidence 
for the implication of the costly contracting hy- 
pothesis that debt pricing reflects the special char- 
acteristics of the borrowers. 
The sole reliance of lenders on the borrower size 
to determine both the obligation to offer financial 
covenants and the amount of the borrowing margin 
raises some intriguing issues. Lenders seem to be 
ignoring the information content of variables tradi- 
tionally and empirical associated with firm risk, 
debt service capacity and financial distress. These 
are inadequately proxied by firm size alone.” 
While financial distress risk is known to fall with 
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firm size, in negotiating the covenant decision and 
the margin for borrowing, the lenders and borrow- 
ers seem to use a blunt instrument rather than fine- 
tune their decision to the more elaborate, but 
nevertheless relevant, borrower characteristics. 
This calls into question the purpose and efficacy of 
various covenants from the borrower’s point of 
view. 
The reasons for lenders not to fine tune the 
covenant requirements and margin on lending to 
borrower characteristics must remain speculative 
at this stage. It is possible that lenders do not em- 
ploy elaborate models of risk assessment which in- 
corporate the variables upon which the covenants 
are based e.g. EBITDA/ total assets. The cost of 
modelling may be high enough not to warrant such 
sophisticated models. Alternatively, there may be 
other information that lenders use as effective 
proxies for the explanatory variables in our mod- 
els. In other words, our models may suffer from a 
missing variable problem. It is also possible that 
the cost of tailoring specific covenants to borrow- 
er characteristics is too costly for the lenders to un- 
dertake. Basing the covenant and pricing decisions 
on a single variable certainly has the virtue of sim- 
plicity and may therefore be cost effective. It is 
also possible that our small sample from one par- 
ticular time period provides only a cross-sectional 
snapshot of the covenant and pricing decisions and 
does not capture the full complexity of the deci- 
sion and negotiation processes. From the borrow- 
er’s perspective, it is not clear why some large 
firms are able to avoid covenants and yet others 
concede them. It may be that the borrowers who 
do concede the covenants do not regard them as 
costly contracts in that they might not provide 
meaningful constraints and equally that bankers 
find it easier to lend with covenants as a form of 
lending that is regarded as legitimate within the 
bank. 
To confirm these speculations, two forms of re- 
search would be valuable: first, a systematic, qual- 
itative survey of lenders and borrowers to establish 
the attitudes to tightness of covenants and towards 
the determinants of margins and how they are ne- 
gotiated and, secondly, a longitudinal study com- 
paring levels of bank borrowing, tightness of 
covenants and levels of economic activity. The lat- 
ter is likely to provide an insight into how 
covenants and pricing decisions evolve over time, 
taking into account the lenders’ and borrowers’ 
prior learning experience from their past interac- 
tion and from relationship banking. 
165 
public debt agreements since the costs of specify- 
ing financial covenants to match the borrower pro- 
file may be less in private contracts. Since loan 
agreements are individually negotiated between 
private lenders and corporate borrowers they may 
allow for customising the financial covenants 
rather than the use of ‘boiler-plate’ financial 
covenants, more common among public debt 
agreements. 
We test the proposition that the decision of bor- 
rowers to provide covenants will be determined by 
their firm-related characteristics such as size, rep- 
utation, risk, or liquidity. Using survey data from 
borrowers among the largest UK corporations we 
model this decision. We find that the only variable 
that significantly influences the decision is the bor- 
rower size. Although we find that covenanters are 
more healthy companies with a lower bankruptcy 
risk and that they exhibit a higher level of system- 
atic stock return risk, neither difference is signifi- 
cant. This suggests that private lenders are still not 
fine-tuning financial covenants to suit their client 
profiles. It appears that financial covenants have a 
limited and broad purpose rather than one geared 
to close and specific monitoring of borrowers. 
We also test whether borrower characteristics in- 
fluence the pricing of private debt. We find that 
none of the borrower characteristics has any im- 
pact on the cost of borrowing to corporate borrow- 
ers except borrower size. We observe that financial 
covenants are still predominantly accrual account- 
ing-based although there is some small trend to- 
wards using cash flow-based measures. Thus in 
spite of advances in cash flow based reporting, ac- 
crual accounting still holds sway. Our results are 
much more consistent with the agency model of fi- 
nancial covenants as a monitoring tool than with 
the costly contracting hypothesis that lenders cus- 
tomise financial covenants to match different bor- 
rower characteristics in order to influence the 
pricing of their lending. 
Many of the borrower characteristics that, a pri- 
ori, are expected to influence the giving of 
covenants and the pricing of private bank debt are 
found to have little influence. Our data sample was 
drawn from a single year and covered only 72 debt 
contracts. Future research of a longitudinal nature 
with larger samples may explain whether our re- 
sults are due to a limited sample size and timing. 
Such research may also include other borrower 
and lender characteristics not examined in this 
study. Our research has been restricted to non-fi- 
nancial firms because of the special characteristics 
of financial firms’ accounting numbers and capital 
structures. Future research may focus on the latter 
firms to examine the types and range of financial 
covenants they offer to their lenders and how their 
debt is priced. Further, our results are specific to 
the large UK firms and future research can extend 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we examine financial covenants in 
private loan agreements within the frameworks of 
the agency model and costly contracting model. 
We focus on private loan agreements rather than . ~ ~ .  Q 
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the sampling to medium and small firms to see 
whether factors other than size are also relevant. 
Use and tightness of financial covenants may 
also depend on the strength of the banking rela- 
tionship, the stage in the economic cycle (Hall, 
2002) and loan-specific characteristics (Beatty et 
al., 2002). These likely determinants may be ex- 
amined in future research. 
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